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In Wallace v. Di-fzer,-33 S. W. Rep. 641, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas has re-asserted the rules of the Common
Law: (i) That when a part of the land belonging
Accretion
a riparian owner is washed away by a sudden
and perceptible process, new land subsequently formed on the
submerged portion belongs to that owner; and (2) That when
the land of a riparian owner on a navigable stream is gradually
and imperceptibly washed away, and the place where it was
remains for many years the bed of the river, the owner does
not acquire title by accretion to new land subsequently formed
within his original boundaries, unless its formation began at
high-water mark.
The general employment of an attorney to prosecute an
action does not confer on him the power to dismiss it; and the
Attorney,

re-instatement of an action thus dismissed without

authority rests in the discretion of the trial court :
RIutasel v. Rule, (Supreme Court of Iowa,) 65 N. W. Rep.
Powers

1013.
By analogy- with the rule which prevails in the case of
coupon tickets issued for passage over the lines of different
companies, if a system of railways, owned by one
Carriers,
company, or operated under one management, is
Coupon
Tickets,
divided into separate divisions, a valid ticket, with
Stop-Over

coupons attached to it for each
of those divisions,

will, in the absence of any specific contract or express restriction upon the ticket to the contrary, entitle the person who has
the right to use the ticket to stop over at the end of each
division, and then resume his journey on the next coupon of
the same ticket, provided that this is done within the final limit
fixed by the ticket: Spencer v. Lovejoy, (Supreme Court of
-Georgia,) 23 S. E. Rep. 836.
I84
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The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has recently
decided, in accordance with the consensus of authority, that a
charitable corporation is not liable for the torts of
Charitable
Corporation, its agents, unless it has been negligent in selectLiability for
Negligenceof

Servants

ing them; and consequently that a hospital is not

liable for injuries to a patient caused by the negli-

gent treatment of the physicians and nurses employed by it,
if it has exercised due care in its selection of them: Hearns
v. Waterbuoy Hospital, 33 At. Rep. 595,
It is the generally accepted doctrine, that a charitable institution of whatever kind, hospital, school, or reformatory,
whether supported by the state or by private subscriptions and
donations, is not liable for the negligence or wilful torts of its
employes, so long as it exercises due care in selecting them,
on the principle that damages in such case ought to be paid
out of the pocket of the wrongdoer, and not from the trust
fund, donated and controlled for other purposes: Williamsson
v. Louisville IndustrialSchool of Reform, 95 Ky. 251 ; Perry v.
House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20; McDonald v, Massachusetts
General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Benton v. Trustees, 140
Mass. I3; Downes v. HarperHospital, ioi Mich, 555; Haas
v. Mfissionay Society, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 868 ; s. c., 6 Misc. Rep.
281 ; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 375. Contra: Donaldson v. Commissioners, 3o N. B. R. 279; Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411. This rule applies, though
those patients who are pecuniarily able are required to pay a
fee for treatment in the hospital, proportionate to their circumstances: .lcDonald v. 17assachusetts General Hospital, 120
Mass. 432 ; Dow-vnes v. HarperHospital, ioi A\ich. 555.
The same principles apply to the case of an employer who
maintains a hospital for the care of injured employes, whether
he assumes that duty voluntarily, or under statutory compulsion ; in either case he will not be liable for the negligence of
the physicians, surgeons and attendants, if they are competent: Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Artist, 6o Fed. Rep. 365;
Pierce v. U.nion Pacific Ry. Co., 66 Fed Rep. 44; Southern
Florida R. R. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46; Ezghiy v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., (Iowa,) 61 N. W. Rep. io56; Atchison,.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

Topeka & Santa Fe R)'. Co. v. Ziegler, (Kans.) 38 Pac. Rep.
282; O'Brien v. Cunard S. S. Co., (Mass.) 28 N. E. Rep.
266; Laubheiser v. De Koninglyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot
MfaatschapPy, 107 N. Y. 228 ; Allen v. State S. S. Co., (N. Y.)
3o N. E. Rep. 482, reversing 8 N. Y. Suppl. 803. This is
true, even though the hospital is supported by forced contributions from the employes, so long as the employer himself
derives no profit from it: Richardion v. Carbon Hill Coal Co.,
io Wash. 648.
Judge Morrow, of the District Court of the Northern District of California, has lately held, following In re Look Tin
Citizenship, Sing, 21 Fcd. Rep. 905, and Gee Fook Sing v.
Child of
United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146, that a person
Chinese

Parents
born within the limits of the United States, whose
father and mother were both persons of Chinese descent, and
subjects of the Emperor of China, but were, at the time of the
birth, both domiciled residents of the United States, is a citizen
of the United States, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment: lit re Wong Kim Ark, 71 Fed. Rep. 382.
The Circuit Co-urt of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit has
lately refused to yield its own opinion to a contrary decision
Conflict of
of the Supreme Court of Indiana, rendered on the
Laws,
same transaction after the argument and before
Federal

Courts,
Following

State

Decisions

the decision of the cause in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, since that decision seemed to the latter
court to be in plain conflict with the weight of

authority on the subject, and distinctly inconsistent with the
previous decisions of the State Court, and the question presented seemed to it to be one that was not balanced with doubt,
but clearly to require a decision contrary to that of the State
Court: Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 71 Fed. Rep. 443.
The question on which the State and Federal Court differed
was the constitutionality of a statute giving an appeal to the
courts from the decision by the board of county commissioners
of the question of the annexation of territory by a city; the
former holding it constitutional, the latter unconstitutional and
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vo!d, on the ground that the decision of the. question of
annexation under the statute involved the exercise of legisative discretion, making its action the performance of a legislative function, which could not be performed by the courts.
In B z-gess %-.Scligman, io7 U. S. 20. the Supreme Court
of the United States laid down briefly the rules defining the
extent to which the Federal courts are bound by State decisions, as follows:
"The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of State laws, co-ordinate with, and not subordinate to, that of the
State courts, and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to the
meaning and effect of those laws. The existence of two co-ordinate jurisdictions in the same territory is peculiar, and the results would be anomalous and inconvenient but for the exercise of mutual respect and deference.
Since the ordinary administration of the law is carried on by the State
courts, it necessarily happens that by the course of their decisions certain
rules are established which become rules of property and action in the
State, and have all the effect of law, and which it would be wrong to disturb. This is especially true with regard to the law of real estate and the
construction of State constitutions and statutes. Such established rules
are always regarded by the Federal courts, no less than by the State
courts themselves, as authoritative declarations of what the law is. But
where the law has not been thus settled, it is the right and duty of the
Federal courts to exercise their own judgment, as they also always do in
reference to the doctrines of commercial law and generaljurisprudence. So
when contracts and transactions have been entered into, and rights have
accrued thereon under a particular state of the decisions, or when there
has been no decision, of the State tribunals, the Federal courts properly
claim the right to adopt their own interpretation of the law applicable to
the case, although a different interpretation may be adopted by the State
courts after such rights have accrued. But even in such cases, for the
sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, the Federal courts will lean
toward an agreement of views with the State courts if the question seems
to them balanced with doubt. Acting on these principles, founded as
they are on comity and good sense, the courts of the United States, without sacrificing their own dignity as independent tribunals, endeavor to
avoid, and in most cases do avoid, any unseemly conflict with the wellconsidered decisions of the State courts. As, however, the very object
of giving to the national courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the
States in controversies between citizens of different States was to institute
independent tribunals, which, it might be supposed, would be unaffected
by local prejudices and sectional views, it would be a dereliction of their
duty not to exercise an independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by
previous adjudication."

According to these rules. which have been followed implicitly ever since they were thus promulgated, the Federal
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courts decide all questions of general law for themselves,.
irrespective of the decisions of the State courts on the same
questions, giving the latter only so much weight as they
choose to allow them. For instance, the question of what is
or is not a navigable stream is one of general law, on which
the Federal courts may exercise an independent judgment:
Chisolm v. Caincs, 67 Fed. Rep. 285. So is the question
whether a carrier can stipulate for exemption from liability for
its own negligence: Ellis v. St. Louis, Kansas & Northwestern
Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 903 ; and whether two employes of the
same master are fellow-servants: Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.
v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368. But when the Federal courts are
called on to construe the general commercial law of a State,
in respect of a question which is new to them, they should
give due weight to the prior decisions of the courts of that
State, though they are not absolutely bound thereby:
Farmer's Natl. Bk. of Valparaiso v. Sutton 4fg. Co., 52 Fed.
Rep. 19 1. So, if rights have accrued before the decision of the
State courts on a matter of local law, the Federal courts are
not bound by the latter, though they are entitled to their consideration : Enfield v. Jordan, I 19 U. S. 68o; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393.
On the other hand, questions arising under the local laws
of the different States, which are of purely local interest, or
which establish a rule of property, are to be decided by the
Federal courts in conformity to the State decisions ; and this
is so, even though the States are at variance among themselves on these points: Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670; Randolph v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. 5. 457; Chicago Union Bk. v.
Kansas Cty Bk., 136 U. S. 223; Mfay v. Tenney, 148 U. S.
6o. Accordingly, if a statute of one State, which has there
received a settled interpretation, is adopted in another State,
and there construed differently, the latter construction will be
accepted by the Federal courts as the true interpretation for
that State: Chicago, R. . & P. Ry. Co. v. Stahley, 62 Fed.
Rep. 363.
This rule as to comity is so carefully followed, that the
Supreme Court of the United States will follow the construc-
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tion given to a State statute of limitations by the State courts,
even in a case decided the other way by the Circuit Court
before the decision of the State court : Bauseirman v. Blunt,
147 U. S. 647; and a lower Federal court will reverse its
decision that a State statute is unconstitutional in deference to
a subsequent decision of the State supreme court that it is
constitutional, if a final decree has not yet been entered in the
Federal court: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poe, 64 Fed. Rep. 9.
If, however, the rights of a litigant in a Federal court have
arisen under decisions of a State court establishing a rule of
property, which has been impaired or overthrown since the
accrual of those rights by a later decision of the State
supreme court, the Federal court will not consider itself bound
by the latter decision, but will exercise its own judgment:
Cltisohi v. Caines, 67 Fed. Rep. 285.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Denney v. State, 42 N.
E. Rep. 929, has recently gone fully over the question of the
Constitutional validity of the legislative apportionment act of
Law,
that State, and has laid down a number of valuable
Legislative
Apportion.
ment,
Power of

rules in relation to the general principles involved.
It holds, (i) That the question as to the validity

of such a law is not a political one, subject only to
the discretion of the legislature ; but that the courts of law
have jurisdiction to determine its constitutionality; (2) That
article 4 of the Constitution of that State, which in § 4 requires a sexennial enumeration of the male inhabitants of the
State over the age of twenty-one, and in 5 provides that at
the next session after each period of enumeration, the number
of senators and representatives shall be apportioned among the
several counties, prohibits the legislature, after it has made a
valid apportionment of the State after such an enumeration, to
reapportion the State during the six years period; and that
the legislature is, also, precluded from repealing a valid apportionment law during the enumeration period in which it was
passed : (3) That if the first apportionment law is unconstitutional, the legislature may at any time during the same
enumeration peri6d pass a second apportionment law, even
Court
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before the first one has been declared unconstitutional by a
judicial tribunal; (4) That under constitutional provisions
that the number of senators and representatives shall be apportioned among the several counties according to the male
inhabitants over the age of twenty-one in each, (Const. Ind.
Art. 4, § 5,) and that a senatorial or representative district,
when more than one county shall constitute a district, shall be
composed of contiguous counties, and that no county, for
senatorial apportionment, shall ever be divided, (§ 6.) an
apportionment act which groups together two or more counties,
none of which has a voting population equal to the ratio for a
senator or a representative, and gives to the district so formed
more than one senator or representative, is unconstitutional,
as an abuse of the legislative discretion of approximation, and
derogatory to the right of local representation; especially
when voters of other counties having the necessary ratio of
voters are entitled under the act to vote for but one senator
or representative; (5) That, unless it is absolutely necessary,
a county which has slightly over the ratio for a representative
should not be given one representative and also a voice in the
election of another representative, in connection with other
counties, while counties with a greater population are given
only one representative (6) That a judgment of the lower
court, an appeal from which is dismissed, in an action between
two citizens to test the constitutionality of an apportionment
law, is not resjudicata, as to the constitutionality of the act,
in a subsequent action by the state; nor will the doctrine of
stare decisis require that that judgment be followed ; and (7)
That the fact that an election of members of the legislature
has been had under an unconstitutional apportionment act does
not estop the state from contesting its constitutionality before
the election of the next legislature.
The same court has recently decided, that whenever a
statute, which purports to be a general law, is by known
existing circumstances, of which the court can
Statutes,
Special
take judicial notice, (e. g., by the limits of popuLaws
lation named therein,) restricted to one particuiar
locality, it becomes ipso facto a special law, and is obnox-
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ions to the provision of the constitution that the legislature
shall not pass special laws on certain subjects, Jlode v.
Beas/4', 42 N. E. Rep. 727.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently held, reversing the decision of Kekewich, J,, [I895 ] 2 Ch. 593, that a
hexagonal metal stove, havdesign for an upright
1
Copyright,
ing on the sides the representation in metal Work
Design,
Infringement of a church window, of a particular style of architecture, with tracery above and below, registered as applicable
to pattern, shape and configuration, was infringed by the manufacture of an upright hexagonal stove with a design of a church
window, of a different style of architecture, and with different
tracery, but in its general appearance very similar to that of
the plaintiff's : iziper & Co. v. THSight & Butler Lamp Mfg.
Co., [1896] 1 Ch. 142.
In the same case, the court laid down several general rules
in regard to the registration of designs, as follows
(I) That when a design is registered as applicable to pattern,
shape and configuration, the registration applies to the design
as a whole; and it is protected, although in all of those particulars it may not be novel ;
(2) That the owner of a registered design is not deprived of
his right to protection merely because he places on the articles
which he sells, besides the registered number of his design,
other numbers which ought not to be there;
,(3) That when a design is registered, and before the expiration of the term of protection, the same design is registered
with an unimportant variation, the original design may be
copied as soon as the original term of protection expires, if
the variation is not copied.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the notice of a meeting of the directors of a
Corporations, corporation, unless there is some by-law or fixed
practice in that regard, is insufficient, if not
Directors,
received by the members of the board before the
.Meetings,
Notice

morning of the day on which the meeting is to be,
and that a notice of a special meeting of the board, stating that
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its purpose was to hear the treasurer's report, and transact any
other business that might come before the board, was insufficient, when the business actually transacted at the meeting
included a perpetual lease, which involved the practical surrender of the active duties of the corporate trust; especially
in view of the fact that successors to the then board were
soon to be elected : Jfer-cantil" Librariy Hall Co. v. Pittsbur-g
Library Assn., 33 At. Rep. 744.
The Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Department, has
recently held, that a power of attorney, irrevocablc for ten
years, executed by joint owners of corporate stock
Stock,
to one of their number to vote on the stock, is
Voting,
Joint Owners, not void as against public policy ; and that such a
Proxy
power of attorney is not within the
Act of 1892,
"
every proxy shall be rec. 687, § 2 I, which provides that
vocable at the pleasure of the person executing it," since it is
not of the ordinary character, and none of the joint owners
could have voted on the stock without the consent of all the
others: Hey v. Dolphin, 36 N. Y. Suppl. 627.
When the facts in an action against the sureties on a bail
bond show that the defendant released on bail has been
that
CriminalLaw, adjudged a lunatic in a proper proceeding for
purpose, and confined in an asylum by the state;
Bail,
Forfeiture
that the governor has remitted the forfeiture of the
Lunacy of
bail bond; and that the defendant was in fact inDefendant
sane ;-such facts are a complete defence to any proceeding
against the sureties on the bail bond: Mood v. Commonwealth,
(Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 33 S. W. Rep. 729.
The punctuation of an instrument may be considered, in
order to solve an ambiguity which was not
Deed,
Construction, created by the punctuation: Olivet v. Whitworth,
Punctuation (Court of Appeals of Maryland,) 33 At. Rep. 723.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has lately held, that a
voter cannot mark with a cross the name of a person printed
on a ballot, and also insert in the blank space proElections,
vided for the same office an additional name, even
Ballots,
though it be similar to the other; and that a
Marking
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ballot so marked should be rejected in the count: Rcdman's
Appeal, 33 Atl. Rep. 702.
It is unnecessary to comment on this decision further than
to say, that if the object of the ballot laws is to further the
intention of the voter, as seems to be generally acknowledged,
and not to thwart it; and if, as also would seem to be the case,
the writing of the name of a person in the blank space provided
indicates an intention to vote for him, irrespective of other
marks, then this decision is incorrect.
When, in an action against a telegraph company and an
electric street-car cohipany for death caused by a shock from
a current conducted from the feed-wires of the
Electric
railway company through a wild wire hanging
Companies,
Negligence
from the telegraph company's poles, the evidence
shows that the wild wire had been hanging across the feedwire
for at least two weeks, rubbing against the insulation, and that
the rubbing would render the insulation defective, and there is
no evidence of any other way in which the wild wire could be
charged with electricity other than by the feed-wire, it is proper
to refuse to instruct, at the request of either defendant, that
there is no evidence that the death was caused by its negligence: IVestern Union Tel. Co. qf Baltimore ci , v. State,
(Court of Appeals of Maryland,) 33 Atl. Rep. 763.
It has been recently decided, that the proper method of
taking advantage of a failure to number the paragraphs of a
bill in equity, as required by statute, is by motion
Equity,
Pleading
in the nature of a ne recipiattir, and not by demurrer: Chew v. Glenn, (Court of Appeals of Maryland,) 33
Atl. Rep. 722.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, the business of an insurance agent is a "trade or
profession" within the meaningof the laws (Sayles's
Execution,
Tex. Civ. Stat. Art. 2337) providing for exemption
Exemption
from execution; and an iron safe used by him to store his
policies, &c., is a "tool" or "apparatus," within the same
statute: Betz v. M1faier, 33 S. W. Rep. 710.
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The word ' tool " includes any instrument necessary to the
successful prosecution of a trade, and, therefore, a lathe and
appliances, costing about two hundred and fift5 dollars, used
for shaping wood or metal, which are necessary to a mechanic
and machinist in carrying on his business, is a tool, and may
be properly set apart to him as exempt: In re Robb, 99 Cal.
202.
So, a tailor may claim two sewing machines as exempt,
if they are kept and personally used for his trade, and are
reasonably necessary therefor: Cronfeldt v. Arrol, 5o Minn.
327. It is a question for the jury, however, under proper
instructions as to the law, whether the manager of a printing
establishment, consisting of four printing presses, (three of
which are operated by steam,) a miscellaneous assortment of
type, a paper-cutting machine, and the general paraphernalia
of a printing-office, costing in the aggregate three thousand
five hundred dollars, can claim the whole plant as exempt, on
the ground that the whole of it is necessary to carry on his
trade; and a verdict against such a claim of exemption cannot
be disturbed for want of evidence to support it, when there is
evidence to show that a practical printer can make a living
with one press and five or six hundred dollars worth of type:
In re Mitchell, 102 Cal. 534.
The word "implements " has a broader meaning than
tools," and includes any instrument needed and used for the
purpose of carrying on a trade or business; and, therefore, a
jeweler's safe owned and used in the business of a jeweler and
watch-repairer is exempt as such: In re 3c2Jlanus, 87
Cal. 292.
There is a marked difference of opinion as to what constitutes a trade within the meaning of the exemption statutes.
The preferable view is that it includes all the occupations and
handicrafts which any one person carries on concurrently:
Ho-ward v. Williams, 2 Pick. 8o; Dozeling v. Clark, i Allen,
283. Contra, Weis v. Levy, 69 Ala. 20 9 ; Jenkins v. _JcVall,
27 Kans. 532; Bevitt v. Crandall, 19 Wis. 58 1. Accordingly,
it has been held that a blacksmith, who occasionally made
wagons, could hold the tools used for both purposes as
exempt : Stewart v. Felton, 32 Mich. 59 ; that one who was
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at the same time a painter, harness-maker and carriage-maker,
could do the same: Ehag-r v. Taylor, 9 Allen, 156; that one
whose general business was dealing in ice, could hold as
exempt his tools for farming or gardening: Pierce v. Gray, 7
Gray, 67; and that a tinner can claim a cornet as exempt, on
the ground that it furnishes him with an additional means of
support: Bakerv. 17illis, 123 Mass. 194. Afortiorithebusiness of saddle and harness-making is one trade, within the
exemption statute: Nichols v. Porter, (Tex.) 26 S. W. Rep.
859.
In Robinson's Appeal, 33 Atl. Rep. 652, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine has held, that the rule of the Common Law, by
Husband and which a devise or grant to a husband and wife
Wife,
made them tenants by entireties, has been abroTenancy by

Entireties,
Married
Women's
Property Acts

gated by the married women's property acts,
which provide that a married woman shall take
and hold real estate as if sole; and that they

now become tenants in common under such a conveyance, as
if both were unmarried.
This rule has been adopted in New Hampshire: Clark v.
Clark, 56 N. H. io5 ; but the weight of authority is overwhelmingly against it: Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219;
Plps v. Simans. 159 Mass. 415 ; Bains v. Bullock, (Mo.) 31
S. W. Rep. 342: Bertles v. unan, 92 N. Y. 152; Hiles v.
Fisher, 144 N. Y. 3o6; _1ob/itt v. Beebe, 23 Oreg. 4: Bramnbery's Appeal, 156 Pa. 628 ; Geoigia -c. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 38
S. Car. 34; llcLeod v. Tatrant, (S. Car.) 17 -,. E. Rep. 773;
Czanbcrs v. Chambers, 92 Tenn. 707; Cole Jf.-. Co. v. Collie-, (Tenn.) 31 S. W. Rep. iooo. But, sinc the right of the
husband to the rents and profits of the wife's lands during
their joint lives has been completely taken away by the married women's property acts, he is not exclusively entitled to
the usufruct of the lands held by them in entirety, but they are
tenants in common or joint tenants of the use, each being
entitled to one-half of the rents and profits, so long as the
question of survivorship remains in abeyance: Hiles v. Fisher,
144 N. Y. 306; and a wife may, since the passage of those
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acts, sue to recover land conveyed to her and her husband in fee,
without joining her husband: Bains v. Bullock, (Mo.) 31 S. W.
Rep. 342.
Where the doctrine of joint tenancy and tenancy by entirety
has never been adopted: Witittlesey v. Fuller, I I Conn. 337;
or where it has been abolished by statute: Oglesbj, v. Bingham, 69 Miss. 795; or by judicial decision: Hoffman v.
Stigers, 28 Iowa, 302 ; Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Ohio, 68 ; the
married women's acts have, of course, made no difference in
the estate created by a conveyance to husband and wife.
In consequence of the disfavor with which all joint tenancies,
including tenancies by entirety, are held, it is now the prevailing doctrine in the United States that a divorce will resolve
a tenancy by entirety into a tenancy in common, so that partition may be had between the tenants: Harrer v. Wallner,
8o Ill. 197; Enyeart v. Kepler, i18 Ind. 36; Russell v. Russell, (Mo.) 26 S. W. Rep. 677; Hopson v. Fowlkes, (Tenn.)
23 S. W. Rep. 55 ; Kirkwood v. Domnan, 8o Tex. 645.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado has recently held, that a
corporation is not entitled to an injunction against persons or
Injunction, organizations, on the ground that they have conBoycott
spired to exterminate it by compelling its members to leave it : Silver State Council No. x of American Order
of Steam Engineers v. Rhodes, 43 Pac. Rep. 45 1.

I

The Court of Appeal of England in Asfarv.Blundell, [1896]
123, has affirmed the decision of Mathew, J., [1895]
2 Q. B. 196; see 32 Ax. L. REG. &REV. (N.S.) 562.
Insurance,
Marine,
A ship having been chartered for a lump sum, the
Total Loss
charterers put her up as a general ship, and goods

Q. B.

were shipped on board under bills of lading, at freights which
in the total exceeded the charter freight. The charterers
insured their profit on charter by a policy which contained a
warranty against average. On the arrival of the ship, part of
the cargo was delivered, and freight was accordingly payable
under the bills of lading for that portion ; but owing to sea
damage, the rest of the cargo had lost its merchantable char-
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acter, and freight was not payable in respect of it; the result
being that the total amount of the freights payable under the
bills of lading was less than the charter freights and the
chartered profit was, consequently, lost. Under these circumstances it was held that there had been a total loss of the
subject-matter of the insurance within the meaning of the
warranty.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has adopted the rule laid
down by all authorities, that the managing editor of a newspaper, whether published by a corporation or by
Libel and
Slander,
an individual proprietor, is equally liable with the
Liability of
Editor
of Newspaper

proprietor and publisher, in a civil action, for the
consequences of the publication of a libelous article;

and this liability is not affected by the fact that he does not
kno'w of the publication of the article, for it is his business to
know, and mere want of knowledge is no defense: Smith v.
Utcj', 65 N. W. Rep. 744.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of
Life Estate, England, the presumption that a tenant for life,
Payment of who pays off a charge upon the inheritance, intends
Charge by
Life Tenant,
Effect

to keep the charge alive for his own benefit, is not
rebutted by the mere fact that the relation of parent

and child exists between the tenant for life and the remainderman: In re HaTey, [1896] i Ch. 137.
Though, in general, a city council may enact a valid regulation by resolution as well as by ordinance, yet, if the charter
requires an ordinance to be in a specified form,
Municipal
Corporations, such ordinances are of greater weight than a mere
Ordinance
Creating and

Resolution

Abolishing
Office,
Effect

resolution, and cannot be repealed by a resolution.since a legislative act can only be repealed by one

of equal authority; and, therefore, if the council
attempts by resolution to abolish an office created
by ordinance, in the manner prescribed by its charter, the
incumbent of that office remains an officer de jure until his
term expires; and if he offers to perform the duties of his
office, he is entitled to his salary, though he does not in fact
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perform them : City of San Antonio v. icklejohn, (Supreme
Court of Texas,) 33 S. W. Rep. 735.
As a general rule, when the charter of a municipal corporation commits the decision of any matter to the council,
and is silent as to the mode of decision, it may be decided by
resolution, and not necessarily by an ordinance: Atchison
Board of Education v. De Kay, 148 U. S. 591 ; Arkadelphia
Lumber Co. v. Arkadelphia, 56 Ark. 370; Gas Company
v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. i9o; C'rawfordsville v. Braden,
130 Ind. 149; Bath Wirc Co. v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. Co., 70 Iowa, 105 ; First .Aunicipalio , v. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335 ; McGavock v. Omaha, 40 Neb. 64; State
v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L. 493 ; Butler v. Fassaic,44 N. J. L.
171; State v. Board of Health, 54 N. J. L. 325; Brady v.
Bayonne, (N. J.) 30 Atl. Rep. 968 ; Sower v. Philadelphia,35
Pa. 231; Green Ba)' v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204. But, if the
charter expressly requires action by ordinance, a resolution is
unavailing: Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kans. 456; State v.
Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. 335 ; State v. Bayonne, 54 N. J. L. 474;
Avis v. ineland, 55 N. J. L. 285; and even if action might
have been taken, in the first instance, by resolution, a resolution will not avail to repeal an ordinance passed with all
due formalities : Ryce v. Osage, 88 Iowa, 558. Further, if
the charter requires all ordinances to be submitted to the
mayor for approval, a resolution not presented to him cannot
in any case have the effect of an ordinance: Eichcnlaub v. St.
Josep:, I 13 Mo. 395; but even when the charter expressly
states that the council may act by ordinance, an act, though
termed a resolution, will be valid, if adopted and approved by
the mayor, with all the formalities required in the enactment
of an ordinance: Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. App. 612.
A nuisance, such as the pollution of a stream, though delared a crime by statute, may be enjoined, if its
Nuisance,
Crime,
result would be irreparable injury to the persons
Injunction or property of others: Barrett v. Jf. Grecnwood
Cemetery Assn., (Supreme Court of Illinois,) 42 N. E. Rep.
.891.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently defined in
a very lucid manner the functions of proceedings to test the
title of a public officer by quo warranto and cerPublic
Officer,
tiorari. It holds, (i) That though collateral quesTitleto
tions regarding the legality of an election to office
Office,
Review,
Quo 'aarranto,
Certiorari

may be raised and decided by certiorari,in testing
the validity of laws, or the ordinances and resolutions of municipal bodies, yet, if the purpose of

the writ is clearly to try the title to a public office, and the
proceeding of the municipal body brought up by the writ consists only of the resolution or other action electing a person to
the office in question, the writ will be dismissed, because quo
,warranto,or an information in nature thereof, is the only proceeding by which the title of the person so elected and claim.ing the office can be attacked; and (2) That the incumbent of
an office cannot proceed by quo wuarranto, or information in
the nature thereof, against one who, though he claims title to
the office, has not been in possession and user of it. He must
first await the attack of his adversary. But, if the claimant
succeeds in obtaining possession and user of the office, otherwise than by suit, as by color of an election or appointment,
then the only remedy of the prior incumbent is by quo warranto, or information in the nature thereof: State v. Afayor,
&c., of City of Bayonne, 33 Atl. Rep. 734 ; State v. Board of
Chosen Freeholdersof Cumberiand Co., 33 Atl. Rep. 737.
On the other hand, the appointment of a minor official, who
is not a public officer in the legal signification of that term, can
be reviewed by certiorari; and, therefore, certiorariwill lie to
review the legality of proceedings for the removal of one who
holds the position of janitor of a county courthouse under an
appointment of the board of chosen freeholders, and for filling
the position by another appointment: State v. Boardof Chosen
Freeholdersof County of Esser, (Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 33 Atl. Rep. 739.

If a lot owner is allowed by a borough to plant shade trees
between the line of the pavement and the driveway, which are
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Streets,
Change of
Grade,
Damages,
Trees

cared for by him for a number of years, so that
they may add value to his property, and is also
permitted to erect a porch over part of the pavement, the destruction of the trees and injury to

the porch may be considered in determining how far the
market value of the property is affected by a change of grade
in the street, though no damages can be expressly allowed on
either ground : Seaman v. Borough of Washington, (Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania,) 33 Atl. Rep. 756.
When a stockholder of a corporation did not act as its
agent in negotiating a contract on which it sues,
Witness,
Competency, he is not an incompetent witness, as a party to
Transaction
the contract, within the statutes providing that a
with
Decedent

party in interest shall be incompetent, if one of the

original parties to the contract in issue is dead : I'ilcoxson v.
Rood, (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i,) 33 S. W.

Rep. 8 I6.
Ardemus Stewart.

